11th Marines OIF I
Highway One
23 – 30 March 2003 – THE BLUE DIAMOND DOES AN END RUN ON THE REPUBLICAN GUARDS IN AL KUT
The First Marine Division’s scheme of maneuver called for the Division to fix the Baghdad Republican Guard Division in Al Kut with a supporting attack by RCT-1 up Highway 7 while the main attack of the Division moved to bypass Al Kut by attacking up Highway 1 to Hantush and turning right onto Highway 27 to cross the Tigres River behind the Baghdad Division. The attack would then continue along Highway 6 to to Baghdad. Highway 1 was still in various stages of construction with much of roadway graded but unpaved. In many locations cuts in the elevated roadbed had been made for uninstalled culverts and units had to use parallel constructions roads to get around these obstacles.
“As the Division was now attacking in two widely separated columns (and the weather was deteriorating), the direct support artillery battalion for each RCT gained the gratitude of its supported unit. RCT-5 was reassured by the all-weather, responsive fire support provided by 2nd Battalion, 11th Marines (2/11). This battalion, and supporting/reinforcing battalions of the 11th Marines, provided continuous fire support throughout a period of very poor weather. On the 24th, for example, 2/11 continued to echelon itself forward with the progress of the RCT. Through multiple displacements forward, 2/11 always remained fire-capable in position areas alongside Highway 1. During these displacements, they had fired 131 rounds in 3 missions. The Cannon Cockers provided counterbattery fire that quickly silenced the numerous enemy indirect fire attacks on the RCT.” (With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003)
The 1st Marine Division scheme of maneuver.
E 2/11 on the move on Highway 1. Note the incomplete roadbed of the unfinished highway.
ALL WEATHER FIRE SUPPORT ON HIGHWAY 1
As the Division pushed its attack up Highway 1, Mother Nature did something that the Iraqi Army couldn’t – halt the Division attack. Division Marines got an early look at what a mission to Mars might look like when the blowing sands turned the sky orange and limited visibility to mere feet. The severe weather completely shut down air support and Iraqi regular and irregular forces tried to take advantage of this by launching attacks against the Division’s column on Highway 1. With air shut down, the Cannon Cockers proved the capability of artillery to provide all-weather fire support as they continued to answer calls for fire under the extreme weather conditions.
As noted in official history of the campaign; on the night of 25 March 2003 - “The 3/5 CP reported to the RCT-5 CP that they could hear armored vehicles approaching. Enemy tanks were so close that the 3/5 Marines could feel the vibrations from the enemy tracks in their defensive positions. The Marines braced for the assault that they knew was coming soon, prepared to defend without air support. The RCT-5 CP reiterated that there was no friendly armor in that area. Through the blowing dirt and sand, 3/5 finally spotted 8-10 Iraqi tanks closing on Lima Company’s lines, and called for artillery support. As the situation continued to develop, a mechanized enemy threat was also identified moving south down Highway 1 toward 3/5’s positions. The all-weather capable 2/11 responded with DPICM and requested reinforcing fires from 11th Marines. The Battalion was allocated the reinforcing fires of 3/11 and 5/11. In no engagement was artillery more effective, as the combined fires of the three artillery battalions rained down on the enemy attack force, forcing them to beat a hasty retreat.” (With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003)
Mother Nature could not stop the 11th Marines from shooting, moving, and communicating.
A Cannon Cocker firing battery pulls into a firing position along Highway 1 during the storm that many would call – “The Orange Crush.”
30 MARCH 2003. THE BLUE DIAMOND WEATHERS THE STORM AND PREPARES TO CONTINUE THE ATTACK.
After enduring several days of unrelenting sand storms, the Division prepped to continue the attack towards Baghdad. Breaks in the weather allowed the Division to rearm and refuel in anticipation of the final push to Baghdad. During the time the Division was stalled on Highway 1, joint deep fires continued to attrite the enemy along the approaches to Baghdad.
The Division’s official history describes the plan that would be put into motion.
“The Division attack plan for its push across the Tigris River would entail all three RCTs acting in a coordinated action of fire, maneuver, and exploitation. RCT-1 would serve as the fixing force for the attack, fixing the Baghdad RG Division by fires from a position south of Al Kut on Highway 7. The RCT, with the Recon Battalion attached, would establish blocking positions on both sides of the Gharraf River south of Al Kut, and commence its fires from these positions. RCT-5 would attack to seize the Hantush Airstrip, seize a crossing over the Saddam canal, then finally to seize crossings over the Tigris River in the vicinity of An Numaniyah. The RCT would lead with 3d LAR Battalion to Hantush, who would continue to feint north along Highway 1 in order to fix the Medina Division from the south. First LAR would attack in trace of 3d LAR and set up blocking positions south of the small town of Ash Shumali. They would allow the lead elements of RCT-5 to pass through, then follow in support. First Battalion, 5th Marines would attack to seize the Highway 27 Bridge over the Saddam canal, while 2d Tanks and 3/5 would make the attack into An Numaniyah to seize the 600 meter long bridge over the Tigris located there. Second Battalion, 5th Marines would provide security to the RCT’s western flank, and guide the 8th Engineer Support Battalion to an alternate crossing site to the west of An Numaniyah. The alternate crossing site was upwind of An Numaniyah, and gave the Division a good location to construct another bridge it could use if the An Numaniyah bridge was disabled or closed down by persistent chemicals. The exploitation would come from RCT-7, who would follow in trace of RCT-5 to the Tigris, seizing the An Numaniyah Airfield in the process. Third Battalion, 7th Marines would relieve RCT-5 at the bridge site, and secure the town of An Numaniyah itself.” (With the 1st Marine Division in Iraq, 2003)
With the weather clearing, the Blue Diamond and Cannon Cockers continued the drive to Baghdad.
Meanwhile on Highway Seven
From 21 March to 3 April 1/11 was engaged in heavy fighting along Highway 7
Within hours of crossing the border into Iraq, 1/11’s mission was changed to Direct Support (DS) of RCT-1. RCT-1’s mission was to attack and clear Main Supply Route (MSR) Tampa, with a follow-on mission to conduct a supporting attack north on Route 7 to fix the Baghdad Republican Guard Infantry Division in Al Kut. To accomplish its follow on mission, RCT-1 was assigned to conduct a passage of lines through Task Force (TF) Tarawa to continue north on Route 7; however, TF Tarawa encountered stiff resistance in An Nasariyah, and was halted, thus holding up RCT-1.
With the RCT halted and TF Tarawa involved in an urban fight with Saddam Fedayeen forces, 1/11 collocated with TF Tarawa’s DS artillery battalion, 1/10, to facilitate additional artillery support to TF Tarawa’s units in contact. The battalion, reinforced by the UK’s G Battery, 7th Royal Horse Artillery (RHA), fired numerous missions in support of TF Tarawa.
On 25 March, the battalion detached Battery G, 7th RHA, and began movement north across the Euphrates river and through An Nasiriyah. Under sporadic small arms fire, the battalion made its way through the city to regroup on the northern side of the city. Just west of Al Gharraf, Battery A’s advance party was caught in an unblocked ambush. An RPG impacted the Battery Commander’s hardback HMMWV, wounding the Battery Commander, Captain Jason Frei and 1stSgt John Gilstrap. Dismounted infantry attacked the RCT-1 forward COC and 1/11 (the Jump COC, Battery A and Battery I). For the first time since Vietnam, 1/11 lowered its tubes and Batteries A and I 3/10 direct-fired their 155mm howitzers to silence enemy troops in buildings who were engaging their battery positions.
Throughout RCT-1’s movement north along Route 7, 1/11 provided timely, accurate, massed fires that devastated enemy units and crushed their will to resist.
I 3/10, attached to 1/11, in action on 24 March 2003.
